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Abstract
Graph neural networks (GNNs) have recently gained much attention for node and graph
classification tasks on graph-structured data. However, multiple recent works showed that
an attacker can easily make GNNs predict incorrectly via perturbing the graph structure,
i.e., adding or deleting edges in the graph. We aim to defend against such attacks via
developing certifiably robust GNNs. Specifically, we prove the first certified robustness
guarantee of any GNN for both node and graph classifications against structural pertur-
bation. Moreover, we show that our certified robustness guarantee is tight. Our results
are based on a recently proposed technique called randomized smoothing, which we ex-
tend to graph data. We also empirically evaluate our method for both node and graph
classifications on multiple GNNs and multiple benchmark datasets. For instance, on the
Cora dataset, Graph Convolutional Network with our randomized smoothing can achieve
a certified accuracy of 0.49 when the attacker can arbitrarily add/delete at most 15 edges
in the graph.
1 Introduction
Graphs are a powerful tool to represent data from diverse domains such as social networks,
biology, finance, security, etc.. Node classification and graph classification are two basic tasks
on graphs. Specifically, given a graph, node classification aims to classify nodes in the graph in
a semi-supervised fashion, while graph classification aims to assign a label to the entire graph
instead of individual nodes. Node and graph classifications have many applications, including
but not limited to, profiling users in social networks [57, 20], classifying proteins [17, 43],
and fraud detection [32, 41, 45, 46]. Various methods such as label propagation [59], belief
propagation [33], iterative classification [38], and graph neural networks (GNNs) [22, 17, 16,
43, 53] have been proposed for node/graph classifications. Among them, GNNs have attracted
much attention recently because of their expressiveness and superior performance.
However, several recent works [60, 9, 61, 1, 44] have demonstrated that an attacker can
easily fool GNNs to make incorrect predictions via perturbing 1) the node features and/or
2) the structure of the graph (i.e., adding and/or deleting edges in the graph). Thus, it is
of great importance to develop certifiably robust GNNs against such attacks. To the best of
our knowledge, [62], [2], and [63] are the only existing works to study certified robustness of
GNNs for node classification. Specifically, Zu¨gner et al. [62] formulate the certified robustness
of GNNs as a linear programming problem. Moreover, they derive the certified robustness
guarantee based on the dual form of the optimization problem, which is motivated by [48].
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However, their work assumes the attacker perturbs the node features. Bojchevski et al. [2] and
Zu¨gner et al. [63] study certified robustness of GNNs against structural perturbation. However,
their works are customized to a specific GNN [23].
We aim to bridge this gap in this work. Specifically, we aim to provide certified robustness
guarantees of any GNN classifier against structural perturbations for both node and graph
classification. Towards this goal, we leverage a recently developed technique called randomized
smoothing [4, 29, 24, 28, 8, 18], which can turn any base classifier (e.g., a GNN classifier in
our problem) to a robust one via adding random noise to a testing example (i.e., a graph in
our problem). A classifier is certifiably robust if it provably predicts the same label when the
attacker adds/deletes at most K edges in the graph, where we call K certified perturbation
size.
However, existing randomized smoothing methods are insufficient to certify robustness of
GNNs. Specifically, they all assume testing examples are continuous data and add Gaus-
sian/Laplacian noise to them. However, graph structures are essentially binary data, i.e., a
pair of nodes can be either connected or unconnected; and Gaussian/Laplacian noise is not
semantically meaningful for such binary data. We develop randomized smoothing for binary
data and leverage it to obtain certified robustness of GNNs against structural perturbation.
First, we theoretically derive a certified perturbation size for any GNN classifier with ran-
domized smoothing via addressing several technical challenges. For instance, we divide the
graph structure space into regions in a novel way such that we can apply the Neyman-Pearson
Lemma [31] to certify robustness. We also prove that our derived certified perturbation size is
tight if no assumptions on the GNN classifier are made.
Second, we design a method to compute our certified perturbation size in practice. It
is challenging to compute our certified perturbation size as it involves estimating probability
bounds simultaneously and solving an optimization problem. To address the challenge, we first
adopt the simultaneous confidence interval estimation method [18] to estimate the probability
bounds with probabilistic guarantees. Then, we design an algorithm to solve the optimization
problem to obtain our certified perturbation size with the estimated probability bounds.
We also empirically evaluate our method. Specifically, for node classification, we consider
Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) [22] and Graph Attention Network (GAT) [43] on several
benchmark datasets including Cora, Citeseer, and Pubmed [38]. For graph classification, we
consider Graph Isomorphism Network (GIN) [52] on benchmark datasets including MUTAG,
PROTEINS, and IMDB [54]. For instance, on the Cora dataset, GCN with our randomized
smoothing can achieve certified accuracies of 0.55, 0.50, and 0.49 when the attacker arbitrarily
adds/deletes at most 5, 10, and 15 edges, respectively. On the MUTAG dataset, GIN with
our randomized smoothing can achieve certified accuracies of 0.45, 0.45, and 0.40 when the
attacker arbitrarily adds/deletes at most 5, 10, and 15 edges, respectively.
Our major contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We prove the first certified robustness guarantee of any GNN against structural perturba-
tion. Moreover, we show that our certified robustness guarantee is tight.
• Our certified perturbation size is the solution to an optimization problem and we design
an algorithm to solve the optimization problem.
• We empirically evaluate our method for both node and graph classifications on multiple
benchmark datasets.
2
2 Background on Graph Neural Networks
2.1 Node Classification vs. Graph Classification
We consider GNNs for both node classification [22, 17, 43] and graph classification [17, 52].
Suppose we are given an undirected graph G with node features.
• Node classification. A node classifier predicts labels for nodes in the graph in a semi-
supervised fashion. Specifically, a subset of nodes in G are already labeled, which are
called training nodes and denoted as VT . A node classifier fn takes the graph G and
the training nodes VT as an input and predicts the label for each remaining node, i.e.,
fn(G,VT , u) is the predicted label for a node u.
• Graph classification. A graph classifier aims to predict a label for the entire graph
instead of individual nodes, i.e., fg(G) is the predicted label for the graph G. Such a
graph classifier can be trained using a set of graphs with ground truth labels.
2.2 Adversarial Structural Perturbation
An attacker aims to fool a node classifier or graph classifier to make predictions as the attacker
desires via perturbing the graph structure, i.e., deleting some edges and/or adding some edges
in the graph [60, 9, 61, 1, 44]. Since our work focuses on structural perturbation, we treat the
node feature matrix and the training nodes as constants. Moreover, we simply write a node
classifier fn(G,VT , u) or a graph classifier fg(G) as f(s), where the binary vector s represents
the graph structure. Note that a node classifier should also take a node u as input and predict
its label. However, we omit the explicit dependency on a node u for simplicity. We call s
structure vector. For instance, s can be the concatenation of the upper triangular part of
the adjacency matrix of the graph (excluding the diagonals) when the attacker can modify
the connection status of any pair of nodes, i.e., s includes the connection status for each pair
of nodes in the graph. When the attacker can only modify the connection status between u
and each remaining node, s can also be the uth row of the adjacency matrix of the graph
(excluding the self-loop (u, u)th entry). We assume the structure vector s has n entries. As we
will see, such simplification makes it easier to present our certified robustness against structural
perturbation.
We denote by vector δ ∈ {0, 1}n the attacker’s perturbation to the graph structure. Specif-
ically, δi = 1 if and only if the attacker changes the ith entry in the structure vector s, i.e.,
the attacker changes the connection status of the corresponding pair of nodes. Moreover, s⊕ δ
is the perturbed structure vector, which represents the perturbed graph structure, where ⊕ is
the XOR operator between two binary variables. We use ||δ||0 to measure the magnitude of
the adversarial perturbation as it has semantic meanings. Specifically, ||δ||0 is the number of
node pairs whose connection statuses are modified by the attacker.
3 Certified Robustness
In this section, we derive the certified robustness of arbitrary GNN against structural pertur-
bations.
3
3.1 Randomized Smoothing with Binary Noise
We first define a noise distribution in the discrete structure vector space {0, 1}n. Then, we
define a smoothed classifier based on the noise distribution and a node/graph classifier (called
base classifier). Specifically, we consider the noise vector  has the following probability dis-
tribution in the discrete space {0, 1}n:
Pr(i = 0) = β, Pr(i = 1) = 1− β, (1)
where i = 1, 2, · · · , n. When we add a random noise vector  to the structure vector s, the ith
entry of s is preserved with probability β and changed with probability 1− β. In other words,
our random noise means that, for each pair of nodes in the graph, we keep its connection
status with probability β and change its connection status with probability 1 − β. Based on
the noise distribution and a base node/graph classifier f(s), we define a smoothed classifier
g(s) as follows:
g(s) = arg max
c∈C
Pr(f(s⊕ ) = c), (2)
where C is the set of labels, ⊕ is the XOR operator between two binary variables, Pr(f(s⊕) =
c) is the probability that the base classifier f predicts label c when we add random noise 
to the structure vector s, and g(s) is the label predicted for s by the smoothed classifier.
Moreover, we note that g(s⊕ δ) is the label predicted for the perturbed structure vector s⊕ δ.
Existing randomized smoothing methods [4, 29, 24, 28, 8, 18] add random continuous noise
(e.g., Gaussian noise, Laplacian noise) to a testing example (i.e., the structure vector s in our
case). However, such continuous noise is not meaningful for the binary structure vector.
Our goal is to show that a label is provably the predicted label by the smoothed classifier
g for the perturbed structure vector s ⊕ δ when the `0-norm of the adversarial perturbation
δ, i.e., ‖δ‖0, is bounded. Next, we theoretically derive the certified perturbation size K,
prove the tightness of the certified perturbation size, and discuss how to compute the certified
perturbation size in practice.
3.2 Theoretical Certification
3.2.1 Overview
Let X = s ⊕  and Y = s ⊕ δ ⊕  be two random variables, where  is the random binary
noise drawn from the distribution defined in Equation 1. X and Y represent random structure
vectors obtained by adding random binary noise  to the structure vector s and its perturbed
version s⊕ δ, respectively.
Suppose, when taking X as an input, the base GNN classifier f correctly predicts the
label cA with the largest probability. Then, our key idea is to guarantee that, when taking Y
as an input, f still predicts cA with the largest probability. Moreover, we denote cB as the
predicted label by f with the second largest probability. Then, our goal is to find the maximum
perturbation size such that the following inequality holds:
Pr(f(Y ) = cA) > Pr(f(Y ) = cB). (3)
Note that it is challenging to compute the probabilities Pr(f(Y ) = cA) and Pr(f(Y ) = cB)
exactly because f is highly nonlinear in practice. To address the challenge, we first derive
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a lower bound of Pr(f(Y ) = cA) and an upper bound of Pr(f(Y ) = cB). Then, we require
that the lower bound of Pr(f(Y ) = cA) is larger than the upper bound of Pr(f(Y ) = cB).
Specifically, we derive the lower bound and upper bound by constructing certain regions in the
graph structure space {0, 1}n such that the probabilities Y is in these regions can be efficiently
computed for any ||δ||0 = k. Then, we iteratively search the maximum k under the condition
that the lower bound is larger than the upper bound. Finally, we treat the maximum k as the
certified perturbation size K.
3.2.2 Deriving the lower and upper bounds
Our idea is to divide the graph structure space {0, 1}n into regions in a novel way such that we
can apply the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [31] to derive the lower bound and upper bound. First,
for any data point z ∈ {0, 1}n, we have the density ratio Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) =
( β
1−β
)w−v
based on the
noise distribution defined in Equation 1, where w = ‖s− z‖0 and v = ‖s⊕ δ− z‖0 (please refer
to Section B in for details). Therefore, we have the density ratio Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) =
( β
1−β
)m
for any z ∈
{0, 1}n, where m = −n,−n+1, · · · , n−1, n. Furthermore, we define a regionR(m) as the set of
data points whose density ratios are
( β
1−β
)m
, i.e., R(m) = {z ∈ {0, 1}n : Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) =
( β
1−β
)m},
and we denote by r(m) the corresponding density ratio, i.e., r(m) =
( β
1−β
)m
. Moreover, we
rank the 2n+ 1 regions in a descending order with respect to their density ratios, and denote
the ranked regions as R1,R2, · · · ,R2n+1.
Suppose we are given a lower bound of the largest label probability Pr(f(X) = cA) for cA
and denote it as pA, and an upper bound of the remaining label probability Pr(f(X) = c) for
c 6= cA and denote it as pB. Assuming there exist cA and pA, pB ∈ [0, 1] such that
Pr(f(X) = cA) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ max
c6=cA
Pr(f(X) = c). (4)
Next, we construct two regions A and B such that Pr(X ∈ A) = pA and Pr(X ∈ B) =
pB, respectively. Specifically, we gradually add the regions R1,R2, · · · ,R2n+1 to A until
Pr(X ∈ A) = pA. Moreover, we gradually add the regions R2n+1,R2n, · · · ,R1 to B until
Pr(X ∈ B) = pB. We construct the regions A and B in this way such that we can apply the
Neyman-Pearson Lemma [31] for them. Formally, we define the regions A and B as follows:
A =
a?−1⋃
j=1
Rj ∪Ra? (5)
B =
2n+1⋃
j=b?+1
Rj ∪Rb? , (6)
where
a? = arg min
a∈{1,2,··· ,2n+1}
a, s.t.
a∑
j=1
Pr(X ∈ Rj) ≥ pA,
b? = arg max
b∈{1,2,··· ,2n+1}
b, s.t.
2n+1∑
j=b
Pr(X ∈ Rj) ≥ pB.
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Ra? is any subregion of Ra? such that Pr(X ∈ Ra?) = pA −
∑a∗−1
j=1 Pr(X ∈ Rj), and Rb? is
any subregion of Rb? such that Pr(X ∈ Rb?) = pB −
∑2n+1
j=b∗+1 Pr(X ∈ Rj).
Finally, based on the Neyman-Pearson Lemma, we can derive a lower bound of Pr(f(Y ) =
cA) and an upper bound of Pr(f(Y ) = cB). Formally, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. We have the following bounds:
Pr(f(Y ) = cA) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ A), (7)
Pr(f(Y ) = cB) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ B). (8)
Proof. See Section A.1.
3.2.3 Deriving the certified perturbation size
Given Lemma 1, we can derive the certified perturbation size K as the maximum k such that
the following inequality holds for ∀||δ||0 = k:
Pr(Y ∈ A) > Pr(Y ∈ B). (9)
Formally, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Certified Perturbation Size). Let f be any base node/graph classifier. The ran-
dom noise vector  is defined in Equation 1. The smoothed classifier g is defined in Equation 2.
Given a structure vector s ∈ {0, 1}n, suppose there exist cA and pA, pB ∈ [0, 1] that satisfy
Equation 4. Then, we have
g(s⊕ δ) = cA, ∀||δ||0 ≤ K, (10)
where the certified perturbation size K is the solution to the following optimization problem:
K = arg max k, (11)
s.t. Pr(Y ∈ A) > Pr(Y ∈ B), ∀||δ||0 = k. (12)
Proof. See Section A.2.
Next, we show that our certified perturbation size is tight in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Tightness of the Certified Perturbation Size). Assume pA ≥ pB, pA + pB ≤ 1,
and pA + (|C| − 1) · pB ≥ 1, where |C| is the number of labels. For any perturbation δ with
||δ||0 > K, there exists a base classifier f∗ consistent with Equation 4 such that g(s⊕ δ) 6= cA
or there exist ties.
Proof. See Section A.3.
We have several observations on our major theorems.
• Our theorems are applicable to any base node/graph classifier. Moreover, although we
focus on classifiers on graphs, our theorems are applicable to any base classifier that takes
binary features as input.
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• Our certified perturbation size K depends on pA, pB, and β. In particular, when the
probability bounds pA and pB are tighter, our certified perturbation size K is larger.
We use the probability bounds pA and pB instead of their exact values, because it is
challenging to compute pA and pB exactly.
• When no assumptions on the base classifier are made and randomized smoothing with the
noise distribution defined in Equation 1 is used, it is impossible to certify a perturbation
size larger than K.
3.3 Certification in Practice
Computing our certified perturbation size K in practice faces two challenges. The first chal-
lenge is to estimate the probability bounds pA and pB. The second challenge is to solve the
optimization problem in Equation 11 to get K with the given pA and pB. We leverage the
method developed in [18] to address the first challenge, and we develop an efficient algorithm
to address the second challenge.
Estimating pA and pB: We view the probabilities p1, p2, · · · , p|C| as a multinomial distri-
bution over the label set C. If we sample a noise  from our noise distribution uniformly at
random, then f(s ⊕ ) can be viewed as a sample from the multinomial distribution. Then,
estimating pA and pc for c ∈ C \{cA} is essentially a one-sided simultaneous confidence interval
estimation problem. In particular, we leverage the simultaneous confidence interval estimation
method developed in [18] to estimate these bounds with a confidence level at least 1 − α.
Specifically, we sample d random noise, i.e., 1, 2, · · · , d, from the noise distribution defined
in Equation 1. We denote by dc the frequency of the label c predicted by the base classifier
for the d noisy examples. Formally, we have dc =
∑d
j=1 I(f(s⊕ j) = c) for each c ∈ C and I is
the indicator function. Moreover, we assume cA has the largest frequency and the smoothed
classifier predicts cA as the label, i.e., g(s) = cA. According to [18], we have the following
probability bounds with a confidence level at least 1− α:
pA = B
(
α
|C| ; dcA , d− dcA + 1
)
(13)
pc = B
(
1− α|C| ; dc + 1, d− dc
)
, ∀c 6= cA, (14)
where B(q;u,w) is the qth quantile of a beta distribution with shape parameters u and w.
Then, we estimate pB as follows:
pB = min
(
max
c 6=cA
pc, 1− pA
)
. (15)
Computing K: After estimating pA and pB, we solve the optimization problem in Equa-
tion 11 to obtain K. First, we have:
Pr(Y ∈ A) =
a?−1∑
j=1
Pr(Y ∈ Rj) + (pA −
a?−1∑
j=1
Pr(X ∈ Rj))/ra? , (16)
Pr(Y ∈ B) =
2n+1∑
j=b?+1
Pr(Y ∈ Rj) + (pB −
2n+1∑
j=b?+1
Pr(X ∈ Rj))/rb? , (17)
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where ra? and rb? are the density ratios in the regions Ra? and Rb? , respectively. Therefore,
the key to solve the optimization problem is to compute Pr(X ∈ R(m)) and Pr(Y ∈ R(m))
for each m ∈ {−n,−n+ 1, · · · , n} when ||δ||0 = k. Specifically, we have:
Pr(X ∈ R(m)) =
min{n,n+m}∑
j=max{0,m}
βn−(j−m)(1− β)(j−m) · t(m, j) (18)
Pr(Y ∈ R(m)) =
min{n,n+m}∑
j=max{0,m}
βn−j(1− β)j · t(m, j), (19)
where t(m, j) is defined as follows:
t(m, j) =

0, if (m+ k) mod 2 6= 0,
0, if 2j −m < k,( n−k
2j−m−k
2
)( k
k−m
2
)
, otherwise.
(20)
See Section B for the details on obtaining Equation 18 and 19. Then, we iteratively find the
largest k such that the constraint in Equation 12 is satisfied.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluate our method on multiple GNNs and benchmark datasets for both node classification
and graph classification.
Benchmark datasets and GNNs: We use benchmark graphs and GNNs for both node
and graph classification. Table 1 shows the statistics of our graphs.
• Node classification: We consider Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) [22] and Graph
Attention Network (GAT) [43] for node classification. Moreover, we use the Cora, Cite-
seer, and Pubmed datasets [38]. They are citation graphs, where nodes are documents
and edges indicate citations between them. In particular, an undirected edge between
two documents is created if one cites the other. The bag-of-words feature of a document
is treated as the node feature. Each document also has a label.
• Graph classification: We consider Graph Isomorphism Network (GIN) [52] for graph
classification. Moreover, we use the MUTAG, PROTEINS, and IMDB datasets [54].
MUTAG and PROTEINS are bioinformatics datasets. MUTAG contains 188 mutagenic
aromatic and heteroaromatic nitro compounds, where each compound represents a graph
and each label means whether or not the compound has a mutagenic effect on the Gram-
negative bacterium Salmonella typhimurium. PROTEINS is a dataset where nodes are
secondary structure elements and there is an edge between two nodes if they are neighbors
in the amino-acid sequence or in three-dimensional space. Each protein is represented as
a graph and is labeled as enzyme or non-enzyme. IMDB is a movie collaboration dataset.
Each graph is an ego-network of an actor/actress, where nodes are actors/actresses and
an edge between two actors/actresses indicates that they appear in the same movie. Each
graph is obtained from a certain genre of movies, and the task is to classify the genre of
a graph.
8
Table 1: Dataset statistics.
Dataset #Nodes #Edges #Classes
Node
Classification
Cora 2,708 5,429 7
Citeseer 3,327 4,732 6
Pubmed 19,717 44,338 3
Dataset #Graphs Ave.#Nodes #Classes
Graph
Classification
MUTAG 188 17.9 2
PROTEINS 1,113 39.1 2
IMDB 1,500 13.0 3
Training and testing: For each node classification dataset, following previous works [22, 43],
we sample 20 nodes from each class uniformly at random as the training dataset. Moreover,
we randomly sample 100 nodes for testing. For each graph classification dataset, we use 90%
of the graphs for training and the remaining 10% for testing, similar to [52].
Implementation and parameter setting: We implement our method in pyTorch. To
compute the certified perturbation size, our method needs to specify the noise parameter β,
the confidence level 1− α, and the number of samples d. Unless otherwise mentioned, we set
β = 0.7, 1− α = 99.9%, and d = 10, 000. We also explore the impact of each parameter while
fixing the other parameters to the default settings in our experiments. When computing the
certified perturbation size for a node u in node classification, we consider an attacker perturbs
the connection status between u and the remaining nodes in the graph. We use the publicly
available source code for GCN, GAT, and GIN. Moreover, we use the default settings in the
source code to train classifiers. We use our randomized smoothing to smooth each classifier.
4.2 Experimental Results
Like Cohen et al. [8], we use certified accuracy as the metric to evaluate our method. Specif-
ically, for a smoothed GNN classifier and a given perturbation size, certified accuracy is the
fraction of testing nodes (for node classification) or testing graphs (for graph classification),
whose labels are correctly predicted by the smoothed classifier and whose certified perturbation
size is no smaller than the given perturbation size.
Impact of the noise parameter β: Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively show the certified
accuracy of the smoothed GCN and smoothed GAT vs. perturbation size for different β on
the three node classification datasets. Figure 3 shows the certified accuracy of GIN with
randomized smoothing vs. perturbation size for different β on the three graph classification
datasets.
We have two observations. First, when β = 0.5, the certified accuracy is independent
with the perturbation size, which means that an attacker can not attack a smoothed GNN
classifier via perturbing the graph structure. This is because β = 0.5 essentially means that
the graph is sampled from the space {0, 1}n uniformly at random. In other words, the graph
structure does not contain information about the node labels and a smoothed GNN classifier
is reduced to only using the node features. Second, β controls a tradeoff between accuracy
under no attacks and robustness. Specifically, when β is larger, the accuracy under no attacks
9
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Figure 1: Impact of β on the certified accuracy of the smoothed GCN.
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Figure 2: Impact of β on the certified accuracy of the smoothed GAT.
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Figure 3: Impact of β on the certified accuracy of the smoothed GIN.
(i.e., perturbation size is 0) is larger, but the certified accuracy drops more quickly as the
perturbation size increases.
Impact of the confidence level 1 − α: Figure 4a and 4b show the certified accuracy of
the smoothed GCN and smoothed GIN vs. perturbation size for different confidence levels,
respectively. We observe that as the confidence level 1−α increases, the certified accuracy curve
becomes slightly lower. This is because a higher confidence level leads to a looser estimation
of the probability bound pA and pB, which means a smaller certified perturbation size for
a testing node/graph. However, the differences of the certified accuracies between different
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Figure 4: Impact of 1− α on the certified accuracy of (a) the smoothed GCN and
(b) the smoothed GIN.
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Figure 5: Impact of d on the certified accuracy of (a) the smoothed GCN and (b)
the smoothed GIN.
confidence levels are negligible when the confidence levels are large enough.
Impact of the number of samples d: Figure 5a and 5b show the certified accuracy of
the smoothed GCN and smoothed GIN vs. perturbation size for different numbers of samples
d, respectively. We observe that as the number of samples increases, the certified accuracy
curve becomes higher. This is because a larger number of samples makes the estimated prob-
ability bound pA and pB tighter, which means a larger certified perturbation size for a testing
node/graph. On Cora, the smoothed GCN achieves certified accuracies of 0.55, 0.50, and 0.49
when d = 50K and the attacker arbitrarily adds/deletes at most 5, 10, and 15 edges, respec-
tively. On MUTAG, GIN with our randomized smoothing achieves certified accuracies of 0.45,
0.45, and 0.40 when d = 50K and the attacker arbitrarily adds/deletes at most 5, 10, and 15
edges, respectively.
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5 Related Work
We review studies on certified robustness for classifiers on both non-graph data and graphs.
5.1 Non-graph Data
Various methods have been tried to certify robustness of classifiers. A classifier is certifiably
robust if it predicts the same label for data points in a certain region around an input ex-
ample. Existing certification methods leverage Satisfiability Modulo Theories [37, 5, 12, 21],
mixed integer-linear programming [7, 14, 3], linear programming [48, 49], semidefinite program-
ming [34, 35], dual optimization [10, 11], abstract interpretation [15, 30, 39], and layer-wise
relaxtion [47, 56]. However, these methods are not scalable to large neural networks and/or
are only applicable to specific neural network architectures.
Randomized smoothing [4, 29, 24, 28, 8, 36, 25, 55, 27, 18] was originally developed to
defend against adversarial examples. It was first proposed as an empirical defense [4, 29]. For
instance, Cao and Gong [4] proposed to use uniform random noise from a hypercube centered at
an input example to smooth a base classifier. Lecuyer et al. [24] derived a certified robustness
guarantee for randomized smoothing with Gaussian noise or Laplacian noise via differential
privacy techniques. Li et al. [28] leveraged information theory to derive a tighter certified
robustness guarantee. Cohen et al. [8] leveraged the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [31] to obtain a
tight certified robustness guarantee under L2-norm for randomized smoothing with Gaussian
noise. Specifically, they showed that a smoothed classifier verifiably predicts the same label
when the L2-norm of the adversarial perturbation to an input example is less than a threshold.
Salman et al. [36] designed an adaptive attack against smoothed classifiers and used the at-
tack to train classifiers in an adversarial training paradigm to enlarge the certified robuseness
under L2-norm. Zhai et al. [55] proposed to explicitly maximize the certified robustness via
a new training strategy. All these certification methods focused on top-1 predictions. Jia et
al. [18] extended [8] to derive the first certification of top-k predictions against adversarial ex-
amples. Compared to other methods for certified robustness, randomized smoothing has two
key advantages: 1) it is scalable to large neural networks, and 2) it is applicable to any base
classifier.
However, existing randomized smoothing methods are insufficient to certify robustness of
GNNs against structural perturbations. Specifically, they focus on continuous input examples
and add Gaussian or Laplacian noise to the input examples. However, graph structure is
essentially binary data, and Gaussian or Laplacian noise is not semantically meaningful for the
graph structure.
5.2 Graph Data
Several studies [9, 60, 61, 1, 44, 50, 51, 40, 6] have shown that attackers can fool GNNs via
manipulating the node features and/or graph structure. [50, 51, 58, 42, 13] proposed empirical
defenses without certified robustness guarantees. To the best of our knowledge, [62] and [2] are
the only existing works to study certified robustness of GNNs. Zugner et al. [62] consider node
feature perturbation. In particular, Zugner et al. [62] derived certified robustness for a partic-
ular type of GNN called graph convolutional network [22] against node feature perturbation.
More specifically, they formulated the certified robustness as a linear programming problem,
where the objective is to require that a node’s prediction is constant within an allowable node
12
feature perturbation. Then, they derived the robustness guarantee based on the dual form
of the optimization problem, which is motivated by [48]. Bojchevski et al. [2] and Zu¨gner et
al. [63] consider structural perturbation. However, both the two works are only applicable to a
specific GNN. Specifically, Bojchevski et al. [2] require that GNN prediction is a linear function
of (personalized) PageRank [23] and Zu¨gner et al. [63] can only certify the robustness of GCNs.
We note that a recent work [19] leveraged randomized smoothing to certify the robustness of
community detection against adversarial structural perturbation. They essentially model the
problem as binary classification, i.e., whether a set of nodes are in the same community or
not, and then leverage randomized smoothing to certify its robustness. In contrast, our work
focuses on certified robustness of multi-class classification of GNN against structural pertur-
bation. Furthermore, our method can be applied to any GNN and we show the tightness of
our certified robustness guarantee.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we develop the certified robustness guarantee of GNNs for both node and graph
classifications against structural perturbation. Our results are applicable to any GNN classi-
fier. Our certification is based on randomized smoothing for binary data which we develop in
this work. Moreover, we prove that our certified robustness guarantee is tight when random-
ized smoothing is used and no assumptions on the GNNs are made. Interesting future work
includes 1) extending our method to certify robustness of GNNs against both node-feature
and structural perturbations, and 2) incorporating the information of a given GNN to further
improve the certified robustness guarantee.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We first describe the Neyman-Pearson Lemma, which we use to prove Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 (Neyman-Pearson Lemma for Binary Random Variables). Let X and Y be two
random variables in the discrete space {0, 1}n with probability distributions Pr(X) and Pr(Y ),
respectively. Let h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a random or deterministic function.
• Let S1 = {z ∈ {0, 1}n : Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) > r} and S2 = {z ∈ {0, 1}n : Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) = r} for some
r > 0. Assume S3 ⊆ S2 and S = S1
⋃
S3. If Pr(h(X) = 1) ≥ Pr(X ∈ S), then
Pr(h(Y ) = 1) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ S).
• Let S1 = {z ∈ {0, 1}n : Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) < r} and S2 = {z ∈ {0, 1}n : Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) = r} for some
r > 0. Assume S3 ⊆ S2 and S = S1
⋃
S3. If Pr(h(X) = 1) ≤ Pr(X ∈ S), then
Pr(h(Y ) = 1) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ S).
Proof. The proof can be found in a standard statistics textbook, e.g., [26]. For completeness,
we include the proof here. Without loss of generality, we assume that h is random and denote
h(1|z) (resp. h(0|z)) as the probability that h(z) = 1 (resp. h(z) = 0)). We denote Sc as the
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complement of S, i.e., Sc = {0, 1}n \ S. For any z ∈ S, we have Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) ≥ r, and for any
z ∈ Sc, we have Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) ≤ r. We prove the first part, and the second part can be proved
similarly.
Pr(h(Y ) = 1)− Pr(Y ∈ S) =∑
z∈{0,1}n
h(1|z)Pr(Y = z)−
∑
z∈S
Pr(Y = z)
=
( ∑
z∈Sc
h(1|z)Pr(Y = z) +
∑
z∈S
h(1|z)Pr(Y = z)
)
−
(∑
z∈S
h(1|z)Pr(Y = z) +
∑
z∈S
h(0|z)Pr(Y = z)
)
=
∑
z∈Sc
h(1|z)Pr(Y = z)−
∑
z∈S
h(0|z)Pr(Y = z)
≥ 1
r
( ∑
z∈Sc
h(1|z)Pr(X = z)−
∑
z∈S
h(0|z)Pr(X = z)
)
=
1
r
(( ∑
z∈Sc
h(1|z)Pr(X = z) +
∑
z∈S
h(1|z)Pr(X = z)
)
−
(∑
z∈S
h(1|z)Pr(X = z) +
∑
z∈S
h(0|z)Pr(X = z)
))
=
1
r
( ∑
z∈{0,1}n
h(1|z)Pr(X = z)−
∑
z∈S
Pr(X = z)
)
=
1
r
(
Pr(h(X) = 1)− Pr(X ∈ S)
)
≥ 0.
Next, we restate Lemma 1 and show our proof.
Lemma 1. We have the following bounds:
Pr(f(Y ) = cA) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ A), (7)
Pr(f(Y ) = cB) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ B). (8)
Proof. Based on the regions A and B defined in Equation 5 and Equation 6, we have Pr(X ∈
A) = pA and Pr(X ∈ B) = pB.
Moreover, based on the conditions in Equation 4, we have:
Pr(f(X) = cA) ≥ pA = Pr(X ∈ A);
Pr(f(X) = cB) ≤ pB = Pr(X ∈ B).
Next, we leverage Lemma 2 to derive the condition for Pr(f(Y ) = cA) > Pr(f(Y ) = cB).
Specifically, we define h(z) = I(f(z) = cA). Then, we have:
Pr(h(X) = 1) = Pr(f(X) = cA) ≥ Pr(X ∈ A).
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Moreover, we have Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) > ra? for any z ∈
⋃a?−1
j=1 Rj and Pr(X=z)Pr(Y=z) = ra? for any z ∈ Ra? ,
where ra? is the probability density ratio in the region Ra? . Therefore, according to the first
part of Lemma 2, we have:
Pr(f(Y ) = cA) ≥ Pr(Y ∈ A).
Similarly, based on the second part of Lemma 2, we have:
Pr(f(Y ) = cB) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ B).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that our goal is to make Pr(f(Y ) = cA) > Pr(f(Y ) = cB). Based on Lemma 1, it is
sufficient to require:
Pr(Y ∈ A) > Pr(Y ∈ B). (21)
Therefore, we derive the certified perturbation size K as the maximum k such that the above
inequality holds for ∀||δ||0 = R.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Our idea is to construct a base classifier f∗ consistent with the conditions in Equation 4, but
the smoothed classifier is not guaranteed to predict cA. Let disjoint regions A and B be defined
as in Equation 5 and Equation 6. We denote Γ = {1, 2, · · · , c} \ {cA, cB}. Then, for each label
ci in Γ, we can find a region Ci ⊆ {0, 1}n \ (A ∪ B) such that Ci ∩ Cj = ∅,∀i, j ∈ Γ, i 6= j and
Pr(X ∈ Ci) ≤ pB. We can construct such regions because pA + (|C| − 1) · pB ≥ 1. Given those
regions, we construct the following base classifier:
f∗(z) =

cA if z ∈ A
cB if z ∈ B
ci if z ∈ Ci
By construction, we have Pr(f∗(X) = cA) = pA, Pr(f∗(X) = cB) = pB, and Pr(f∗(X) = ci) ≤
pB for any ci ∈ Γ, which are consistent with Equation 4. From our proof of Theorem 1, we
know that when ||δ||0 > K, we have:
Pr(Y ∈ A) ≤ Pr(Y ∈ B),
or equivalently we have:
Pr(f∗(Y ) = cA) ≤ Pr(f∗(Y ) = cB)
Therefore, we have either g(s⊕ δ) 6= cA or there exist ties when ||δ||0 > K.
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B Computing Pr(X ∈ R(m)) and Pr(Y ∈ R(m))
We first define the following regions:
R(w, v) = {z ∈ {0, 1}n : ||z− s||0 = w and ||z− s⊕ δ||0 = v},
for w, v ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n}. Intuitively, R(w, v) includes the binary vectors that are w bits different
from s and v bits different from s ⊕ δ. Next, we compute the size of the region R(w, v)
when ||δ||0 = k. Without loss of generality, we assume s = [0, 0, · · · , 0] as a zero vector and
s⊕ δ = [1, 1, · · · , 1, 0, 0, · · · , 0], where the first k entries are 1 and the remaining n− k entries
are 0. We construct a binary vector z ∈ R(w, v). Specifically, suppose we flip i zeros in the
last n− k zeros in both s and s⊕ δ. Then, we flip w− i of the first k bits of s and flip the rest
k−w+ i bits of the first k bits of s⊕δ. In order to have z ∈ R(w, v), we need k−w+ i+ i = v,
i.e., i = (w + v − k)/2. Therefore, we have the size |R(w, v)| of the region R(w, v) as follows:
|R(w, v)| =

0, if (w + v − k) mod 2 6= 0,
0, if w + v < k,( n−k
w+v−k
2
)( k
w−v+k
2
)
, otherwise
Moreover, for each z ∈ R(w, v), we have Pr(X = z) = βn−w(1 − β)w and Pr(Y = z) =
βn−v(1− β)v. Therefore, we have:
Pr(X ∈ R(w, v)) = βn−w(1− β)w · |R(w, v)|,
Pr(Y ∈ R(w, v)) = βn−v(1− β)v · |R(w, v)|.
Note that R(m) = ∪v−w=mR(w, v). Therefore, we have:
Pr(X ∈ R(m))
=Pr(X ∈ ∪v−w=mR(w, v))
=Pr(X ∈ ∪min(n,n+m)j=max(0,m)R(j −m, j))
=
min(n,n+m)∑
j=max(0,m)
Pr(X ∈ R(j −m, j))
=
min(n,n+m)∑
j=max(0,m)
βn−(j−m)(1− β)j−m · |R(j −m, j)|
=
min(n,n+m)∑
j=max(0,m)
βn−(j−m)(1− β)j−m · t(m, j),
where t(m, j) = |R(j −m, j)|.
Similarly, we have
Pr(Y ∈ R(m)) =
min(n,n+m)∑
j=max(0,m)
βn−j(1− β)j · t(m, j).
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